ENS, Institut Jean Nicod, meeting room, ground floor, Pavillon Jardin 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris
Arthur Danto’s best known contribution to the philosophy of art is his claim (a) that the contemporary artworks, such as Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box, do not differ from ordinary objects in terms of perception and (b) that to see something as art requires an artistic theory explaining the meaning of the work. In the introductory part of my talk, I will show that Danto’s claim is right in the first part (a) but it should be refuted in the second (b). I will demonstrate that although perception cannot often discriminate between contemporary artworks and ordinary objects, the difference between the two is not articulated only by means of theory but also by means of an experience incited by the work. I will speak of non-perceptual aesthetic experience. In the second part of my talk, I will discuss James Shelley’s theory of non-perceptual aesthetic properties as a possible candidate to explain the non-perceptual aesthetic experience. I will rise an objection to this theory, saying that the alleged non-perceptual aesthetic properties may be reduced to non-intentional mental states. To conclude, I will propose a conception of non-perceptual aesthetic experience as a metacognitive feeling. This feeling is incited as a work, such as the Brillo Box, invites us to an action the awareness of which it immediately frustrates. I will give examples from the domain of conceptual sculpture, conceptual photography, and performance.