Predictive Coding and the Myth of the Given

The Given, as I shall be using the term, is the conjunction of two theses. The first thesis, roughly put, is that sensory experience plays a role in justifying perceptual beliefs. I shall call this thesis empiricist foundationalism. The second thesis is that the capacity to have sensory experiences can be exercised independent of and often prior to cognitive capacities. I shall call this thesis non-cognitivism. It has been famously argued that the Given is a problematic idea. The overarching goal of this paper is to explore the nature of this problem and a satisfactory solution to it. The problem, as I shall argue, consists in the difficulty that is associated with understanding how a move from a purely non cognitive representation to a cognitive one can be guided by reason. Those who have argued against the Given often propose a conceptualist account of perceptual experience to accommodate empiricist foundationalism. I argue that the same sensibilities that push us to militate against the Given force us to find conceptualism inadequate for the task. I end by showing that the conceptualist can save empiricist foundationalism if she combines the view with a predictive coding approach to sensory experience.