Institut Jean Nicod, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris. Conference room of the Pavillon Jardin.
Jury:
Charles Siewert (Rice University)
Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers University)
François Récanati (IJN)
Dorothea Debus (University of York)
M. Uriah Kriegel (IJN, Directeur de thèse)
Abstract:
This dissertation focuses on an introspective phenomenon that I call primitive introspection. Primitive introspection is a non-classificatory kind of phenomenal-state introspection: it is a kind of phenomenal-state introspection that does not involve recognizing the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of any experience type. I defend three main claims about primitive introspection. First, it exists: there is a mental phenomenon that has the features I attribute to primitive introspection and such a phenomenon is a full-fledged introspective process. Second, its nature is best accounted for by a version of the acquaintance theory—what I call the integration account. Third, it has a distinct epistemic value: it provides the subject with knowledge of their phenomenal states. Such knowledge is a sui generis kind of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance displays a distinctive epistemic property which is somewhat analogous to infallibility: it provides the subject with a complete and perfect grasp of the phenomenology of their experience.