The expression ’to dream’ and its cognates are examined, and different senses distinguished. Global dream scepticism is rejected. Cartesian dream scepticism is examined and Descartes’s refutation of it is found faulty. Nevertheless the idea that we cannot know whether we are dreaming or waking is repudiated.
This pluridisciplinary workshop aimed at reflecting on the possibility of moving behavioral, neuroscientific, computational and clinical hearing sciences towards the study of the human auditory system's ability to perceive the ecological processes at work in natural habitats using the tools, data, concepts and theories offered by modern ecoacoustics.
Motivation–the energizing of behavior in pursuit of a goal–is central to daily life. Disruptions in motivation underpin multiple neuropsychiatric disorders, from abnormally low motivation in anhedonia to abnormally high motivation in addiction. Although dopamine (DA) release has long been implicated in motivated behavior, the mechanisms of that link remain unclear.
In this talk, I will present some early results of an empirical study on the meaning of slurs conducted with the help of Rodrigo Diaz (IFS-CSIC, Madrid). Many hypotheses have been proposed in the philosophical and linguistic literature about the meaning of slurs, both in terms of what information these words communicate and by what linguistic mechanisms they communicate it. Our empirical study aims to test, via questionnaires, laypeople’s intuitions to establish to what extent these intuitions correspond to the hypotheses in question.
Des droits de la nature dans le Global South
Séminaire co-porté par le département de géographie de l’ENS et le CERES
Année 2023-2024
Solène Rey-Coquais et Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde
Horaires : Mardi de 16h à 18h
Salle Roncayolo (campus Jourdan)
Christopher Peacocke worked for many years in England, as a Prize Fellow at All Souls College, a Tutorial Fellow at New College, and eventually as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in Oxford University. He moved to New York, at NYU, in 2000.
Abstract: It’s widely thought that metacognitive processes monitor and represent the uncertainty in different parts of the mind and brain, enabling sophisticated forms of cognitive and behavioural control. However, theoretical models have recently stressed that metacognition and uncertainty aren’t the same thing – and there may be a variety of representations about uncertainty or ‘precision’ throughout our perceptual and cognitive systems that are separate from those involved in subjective metacognition and conscious reflection.
