Publications

Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.

Bouvier, A. (1995). Les Paralogismes d'Un Point de Vue Sociologique. Hermes, 16 , 45

Bouvier, A. (1998). Histoire des Idées, Sociologie des Croyances Et Processus Argumentatifs Scepticisme Et Modernité D’Après Richard H. Popkin. Revue de Synthèse, 119(2-3), 307–322

Proust, J. (1999). Indexes for Action. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1999 (3), 321–345

Proust, J. (1999). Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals. Erkenntnis, 51(1 ), 545–562

Proust, J. (2000). Les Conditions de la Connaissance de Soi. Philosophiques, 27(1), 161–186

Boudon, R., Bouvier, A., Demeulenaere, P., Dupuy, J., Engel, P. & Gnassounou, B. (2000). Interventions. Cités, 1, 157–170

Proust, J. (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese, 129(1), 105–128

Pacherie, E. (2001). Agency Lost and Found: A Commentary on Spence. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8(2), 173–176

Schlenker, P. (2002). Conditionals as Definite Descriptions (A Referential Analysis) Journal of Language & Computation, 2(3), 417-462. doi:10.1007/s11168-004-0908-2

Schlenker, P. (2002). A Plea for Monsters . Linguistics and Philosophy, 26(1), 29–120. doi:10.1023/A:1022225203544

Proust, J. (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Philosophical Psychology , 15(4), 543–550

Pacherie, E. (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy , 2(3), 299–317

Pacherie, E. (2002). Emotion and Action. European Review of Philosophy, 5, 55-90

Pacherie, E. (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy , 5, 53–92

Bouvier, A. (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1 ), 51–70

Bouvier, A. (2002). Dans quelle mesure la théorie sociale de James Coleman est-elle trop parcimonieuse?

Schlenker, P. (2003). Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem) Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 21, 157-214. doi:10.1023/A:1021843427276

Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4 ), 495–509

Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue, 447-480

Spector, B. (2004). Indefinites in subject position are positive polarity items. Snippets, 9, 13–14

Schlenker, P. (2004). Context of Thought and Context of Utterance (A Note on Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present) Mind & Language, 19(3), 279-304. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00259.x

Schlenker, P. (2004). Person and Binding: A Partial Survey. Italian Journal of Linguistics/Rivista di Linguistica, 16(1), 155-218

Jeannerod , M. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language, 19(2), 113–146

Bouvier, A. (2004). En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Normative Et de l'Éthique Sociale. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102 (2), 311–332

Bouvier, A. (2004). Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Société Libre? Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Citoyenneté Libératrice? Ce Qui Reste de l'Horizon Marxiste - En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Nor. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102(2), 311–332

Bouvier, A. (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34(3), 382–407. doi:10.1177/0048393103260772

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Experience, Belief and the Interpretive Fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 81-86

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions . Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11(1), 1–11