Publications

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Kriegel, U. (2017). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun. (pp. 7–46).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Philosophical Program. (pp. 21–32 ).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano on Judgment. (pp. 103–109).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena. (pp. 97–102).

Kriegel, U. (2017). Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect. In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (Eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social SignificanceRowman & Littlefield

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan

Kriegel, U. (2017). Introduction. In Uriak Kriegel (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (pp. 1-11). London and New York: Routledge

Ramus, F. (2013). A neurological model of dyslexia and other domain-specific developmental disorders with an associated sensorimotor syndrome. (pp. 75-102). doi:10.4324/9780203774915

Ramus, F. & Szenkovits, G. (2011). Understanding the nature of the phonological deficit. (pp. 153-169). doi:10.4324/9780203838006

Ramus, F., Peperkamp, S., Christophe, A., Jacquemot, C., Kouider, S. & Dupoux, E. (2010). A Psycholinguistic Perspective on the Acquisition of Phonology. In C. Fougeron (Eds.), Laboratory Phonology (Vol. 10 ).De Gruyter Mouton

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

de Vignemont, F. (2021). Feeling the world as being here. In F. de Vignemont, A. Serino, H.Y. Wong, A. Farnè (Eds.), The world at our fingertips: A multidisciplinary investigation of peripersonal space, Oxford : Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Arcangeli, M. & Dokic, J. (2018). Affective Memory: A Little Help From Our Imagination. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, (pp. 139–157).Routledge,

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge