Publications

Proust, J. (2021). Le naturalisme philosophique et les sciences. Raison présente, 219, 53-63. doi:10.3917/rpre.219.0053

Ramus, F., Di Folco , C. , Guez, A. & Peyre, H. (2021). Epidémiologie des troubles de la lecture en France : une comparaison du DSM-5 et de la CIM-11. Approche neuropsychologique des apprentissages chez l'enfant, 175, 639-649

Ramus, F. (2018). Do gifted people have a qualitatively different brain?,Les surdoués ont-ils un cerveau qualitativement différent ? ANAE - Approche Neuropsychologique des Apprentissages chez l'Enfant, 30(154), 281-287

Ramus, F. (2012). Les troubles spécifiques de la lecture. Information Grammaticale, 133, 34-40

Ramus, F. (2011). Quel pouvoir prédictif de la génétique et des neurosciences, et quels problmes? Medecine et Droit, 2011(106), 51-58. doi:10.1016/j.meddro.2010.10.010

Ramus, F. (2008). Génétique de la dyslexie développementale. ANAE - Approche Neuropsychologique des Apprentissages chez l'Enfant, 20, 9-14

Ramus, F. (2005). Aux origines cognitives, neurobiologiques et génétiques de la dyslexie. ANAE - Approche Neuropsychologique des Apprentissages chez l'Enfant, 17, 247-253

Falck, A., Strickland, B. & Jacob, P. (2022). Social Cognition and Moral Evaluation in Early Human Childhood. In O. Houdé & G. Borst (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 269-298). doi:10.1017/9781108399838.016

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2020). Bounded reason in a social world. In Ricardo Viale (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality

Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Arcangeli, M. & Dokic, J. (2018). Affective Memory: A Little Help From Our Imagination. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, (pp. 139–157).Routledge,

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press

Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de Ch. Plantin, 2016, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. Une introduction aux études d’argumentation. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 1-5). Lyon: ENS Editions

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de F.H. Van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E.C.W.Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J.H.M. Wagemans (eds), 2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 7-11). Dordrecht: Springer Verlag

Kriegel, U. (2017). Introduction. In Uriak Kriegel (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (pp. 1-11). London and New York: Routledge

Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan

Kriegel, U. (2017). Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect. In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (Eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social SignificanceRowman & Littlefield