Publications

Proust, J. (2009). On Indicative Conditionals and Rationality in the Wason Task. PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 15(1), 132-136

Proust, J. (2009). Overlooking Metacognitive Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 32(2), 158–159

Schlenker, P. (2009). Local Contexts. Semantics & Pragmatics, 2(3), 1-78. doi:10.3765/sp.2.3

Schlenker, P. (2009). Anselm’s Argument and Berry’s Paradox. Noûs, 43(2), 214-223. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00703.x

Proust, J. (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté Et Disputatio . Philosophiques, 0–00

Proust, J. (2008). XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 108(1pt3), 241–268

Proust, J. (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté. Philosophiques , 35(1), 109

Schlenker, P. (2008). Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection . Theoretical Linguistics, 34(3), 157–212. doi:10.1515/THLI.2008.013

Schlenker, P. (2008). Presupposition Projection: Explanatory Strategies. Theoretical Linguistics, 34(3), 287-316

Spector, B. (2008). An Unnoticed Reading for Wh-Questions: Elided Answers and Weak Islands. Linguistic Inquiry, 39(4), 677-686. doi:10.1162/ling.2008.39.4.677

Bouvier, A. (2007). Collective Belief, Acceptance, and Commitment in Science . Iyyun, 56, 91

Proust, J. (2007). Le Langage Forme-T-Il Une Condition Nécessaire de la Rationalité? Dialogue , 46(1), 165–172

Schlenker, P. (2007). Expressive Presuppositions . Theoretical Linguistics, 33(2), 237-246. doi:10.1515/TL.2007.017

Schlenker, P. (2007). How to Eliminate Self-Reference: A Précis. Synthese, 158(1), 127–138

Schlenker, P. (2007). Anti-Dynamics (Presupposition Projection Without Dynamic Semantics) Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 16(3), 325-356. doi:10.1007/s10849-006-9034-x

Bouvier, A. (2006). L’architecture de la sociologie. Revue du MAUSS, 28, 391 - 402

Proust, J. (2006). Why Evolution has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind . Biological Theory, 1(4), 349-351

Schlenker, P. (2006). Ontological Symmetry in Language: A Brief Manifesto. Mind Language, 21(4), 504–539. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00288.x

Schlenker, P. (2006). Scopal Independence: A Note on Branching & Island-Escaping Readings of Indefinites & Disjunctions. Journal of Semantics(21), 281-314

Schlenker, P. (2005). Non-Redundancy: Towards a Semantic Reinterpretation of Binding Theory. Natural Language Semantics, 13(1), 1–92. doi:10.1007/s11050-004-2440-1

Bouvier, A. (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34(3), 382–407. doi:10.1177/0048393103260772

Bouvier, A. (2004). Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Société Libre? Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Citoyenneté Libératrice? Ce Qui Reste de l'Horizon Marxiste - En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Nor. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102(2), 311–332

Bouvier, A. (2004). En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Normative Et de l'Éthique Sociale. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102 (2), 311–332

Schlenker, P. (2004). Context of Thought and Context of Utterance (A Note on Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present) Mind & Language, 19(3), 279-304. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00259.x

Schlenker, P. (2004). Person and Binding: A Partial Survey. Italian Journal of Linguistics/Rivista di Linguistica, 16(1), 155-218

Spector, B. (2004). Indefinites in subject position are positive polarity items. Snippets, 9, 13–14

Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4 ), 495–509

Schlenker, P. (2003). Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem) Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 21, 157-214. doi:10.1023/A:1021843427276

Bouvier, A. (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1 ), 51–70

Bouvier, A. (2002). Dans quelle mesure la théorie sociale de James Coleman est-elle trop parcimonieuse?