Publications

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Recanati, F. (2017). Contextualism and Polysemy. Dialectica, 71(3), 379–397. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12179

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Langage, discours, pensée. Collège de France

Recanati, F. (2020). Jules Vuillemin Et la Philosophie Analytique. Revue de Synthèse, 141(1-2), 11–33. doi:10.1163/19552343-14000025

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Recanati, F. (2021). Transparent Coreference. Topoi, 40(1), 107–115. doi:10.1007/s11245-019-09674-1

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Recanati, F. (2018). II-Fictional, Metafictional, Parafictional. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 118(1), 25–54. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aoy001

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Recanati, F. (2017). About the lekton. Response to Max Kölbel. In I. Depraetere et R. Salkie (Eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line (pp. 215-224). Berlin: Springer

Recanati, F. (2017). Cognitive Dynamics: A New Look at an Old Problem. In M. de Ponte et K. Korta (Eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language Oxford: Oxford University Press

Recanati, F. (2017). Fictitious Anchors. Theoretical Linguistics 43 (2017) p. 81-93., 43, 81-93

Recanati, F. (2017). Contextualism and Polysemy . Dialectica, 71(3), 379–397

Recanati, F. (2017). Local Pragmatics: Reply to Mandy Simons. Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 60(5), 493–508

Proust, J. (2021). Le naturalisme philosophique et les sciences. Raison présente, 219, 53-63. doi:10.3917/rpre.219.0053

Proust, J. (2019). From Comparative Studies to Interdisciplinary Research on Metacognition. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6(4), 309-328. doi:10.26451/abc.06.04.10.2019

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2016). The Evolution of Primate Communication and Metacommunication. Mind and Language, 31 (2), 177–203

Proust, J. (2015). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(4 ), 717–743. doi:10.1007/s13164-014-0224-1

Proust, J. (2014). Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition . Philosophical Issues, 24(1), 364–392

Proust, J. (2014). Précis of The Philosophy of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3), 703–709. doi:10.1111/phpr.12152

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Proust, J. (2010). Metacognition. Philosophy Compass, 5 (11), 989–998

Proust, J. (2009). On Indicative Conditionals and Rationality in the Wason Task. PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 15(1), 132-136

Proust, J. (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté Et Disputatio . Philosophiques, 0–00

Proust, J. (2008). XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 108(1pt3), 241–268

Proust, J. (2006). Why Evolution has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind . Biological Theory, 1(4), 349-351