Publications

Proust, J. (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Philosophical Psychology , 15(4), 543–550

Proust, J. (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese, 129(1), 105–128

Proust, J. (2000). Les Conditions de la Connaissance de Soi. Philosophiques, 27(1), 161–186

Proust, J. (1999). Indexes for Action. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1999 (3), 321–345

Proust, J. (1999). Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals. Erkenntnis, 51(1 ), 545–562

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2014). Replies to LanglandHassan, Nagel, and Smith. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3 ), 736–755. doi:10.1111/phpr.12151

Proust, J. (2012). The Norms of Acceptance. Philosophical Issues, 22(1 ), 316–333

Proust, J. (2009). Overlooking Metacognitive Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 32(2), 158–159

Proust, J. (2008). Précis de La Nature de la Volonté. Philosophiques , 35(1), 109

Proust, J. (2007). Le Langage Forme-T-Il Une Condition Nécessaire de la Rationalité? Dialogue , 46(1), 165–172

Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4 ), 495–509

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Paulus, M., Tsalas, N., Proust, J. & Sodian, B. (2014). Metacognitive monitoring of oneself and others: developmental changes during childhood and adolescence. Journal of experimental child psychology, 122, 153-165. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2013.12.011

Paulus, M., Proust, J. & Sodian, B. (2013). Examining Implicit Metacognition in 3.5-Year-Old Children: An Eye-Tracking and Pupillometric Study. Frontiers in Psychology , 4, 145. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00145

Oster, A. & Gutkin, B. (2011). A reduced model of DA neuronal dynamics that displays quiescence, tonic firing and bursting. Journal of Physiology Paris, 105, 53-58. doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2011.07.012

Oster, A., Faure, P. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Mechanisms for multiple activity modes of VTA dopamine neurons. Frontiers in computational neuroscience, 9, 95. doi:10.3389/fncom.2015.00095

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Passions Sociales. Paris: PUF

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Origgi, G. (2018). https://www.openaire.eu.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Politicamente corretto. Genesi, sviluppi e derive di un’ideologia Americana. Micromega

Origgi, G. (2018). La democrazia può sopravvivere a Facebook? Egualitarismo epistemico, vulnerabilità cognitiva e nuove tecnologie. Ragion pratica, 445-458. doi:10.1415/91549

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press