Publications

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Gutkin, B. & Ahmed, S. (2012). Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Origgi, G. (2019). Passions Sociales. Paris: PUF

Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.

Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de F.H. Van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E.C.W.Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J.H.M. Wagemans (eds), 2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 7-11). Dordrecht: Springer Verlag

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de Ch. Plantin, 2016, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. Une introduction aux études d’argumentation. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 1-5). Lyon: ENS Editions

Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Gutkin, B. & Stiefel, K. (2014). Cholinergic Neuromodulation of Phase Response Curves. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Graupner, M. & Gutkin, B. (2012). Dynamical Approaches to understanding cholinergic control of nicotine action pathways in the dopaminergic reward circuits. Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction (Springer ed.).Ahmed and Gutkin (eds.)

Bouvier, A. (2011). Individualism, Collective Agency and The “Micro–Macro Relation”. In Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (pp. 199).Sage Publications