Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2001). For Whom is the Problem of the Essential Indexical a Problem? . (pp. 304-315).

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Stojanovic, I. (2005). A Different Story about Indexicals. , Amsterdam: ILLC Research Reports

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Stojanovic, I. (2008). I investigate the relationship among the notions of meaning, content, and what is said. It is widely held that indexicals – words like 'this', 'I', or 'today' – contribute their reference, and nothing but their reference, to the semantic content, and ther. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Stojanovic, I. (2011). Context, Meaning and Logical Truth. In Gupta, A. and van Benthem, J. (Eds.), Logic and Philosophy Today (Vol. 30, pp. 11-24). London: College Publications, Studies in Logic Series

Grèzes, J. & Dezecache, G. (2012). Communication émotionnelle: mécanismes cognitifs et cérébraux. In P. Allain, G. Aubin & D. Le Gal (Eds.), Cognition Sociale et NeuropsychologieSolal

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Emotional Disagreement. The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values. Dialogue, 51(1), 99-117

Dezecache, G. (2013). La communication émotionnelle ou le jeu des affordances sociales. Santé Mentale, 177, 26-31

Stojanovic, I. (2013). Context and the Attitudes.

Grèzes, J. & Dezecache, G. (2014). Bases cérébrales et cognitives de la communication émotionnelle. In M. Botbol (Eds.), L'empathie au carrefour des sciences et de la cliniqueJohn Libbey Eurotext

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP