Publications

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Origgi, G. (2021). Ground Zero. The Triangle of Humiliation. In Yale Political Theory Seminar, Yale, United States.

Chiril, P. , Moriceau, V. , Benamara, F. , Origgi, G., Coulomb-Gully, M. & Mari, A. (2020). He said “who’s gonna take care of your children when you are at ACL?”: Reported Sexist Acts are Not Sexist. In 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 2020, France, 4055-4066. doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.373

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part II) In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Hannover.

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part I) , Vol. 49: In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences , Hannover.

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de Ch. Plantin, 2016, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. Une introduction aux études d’argumentation. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 1-5). Lyon: ENS Editions

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de F.H. Van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E.C.W.Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J.H.M. Wagemans (eds), 2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 7-11). Dordrecht: Springer Verlag

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Bouvier, A. (2011). Individualism, Collective Agency and The “Micro–Macro Relation”. In Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (pp. 199).Sage Publications

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.