Publications

Schlenker, P. (2005). Sens et Contexte . In S. Bourgeois-Gironde, Presses de la rue d'Ulm (Eds.), Les formes de l'Indexicalité (pp. 35-62).

Schlenker, P. (2004). Sequence Phenomena and Double Access Readings Generalized. In Lecarme & Guéron (Eds.), The Syntax of Time (pp. 555-595).MIT Press

Schlenker, P. & Lamberton, J. (2012). Formal Indices and Iconicity in ASL. In Maria Aloni, Vadim Kimmelman, Floris Roelofsen, Galit Weidman Sassoon, Katrin Schulz and Matthijs Westera (Eds.), Logic, Language and Meaning: 18th Amsterdam Colloquium (Vol. 7218, pp. 1-11).Springer

Ruys, E. & Spector, B. (2017). Unexpected Wide-Scope Phenomena. In Everaert, Martin and Henk C. Van Riemsdijk (Eds.), The Companion to SyntaxWiley. doi:10.1002/9781118358733.wbsyncom089

Ripley, D., Verheyen, S. & Egré, P. (2019). The Sorites Paradox in Psychology. In S. Oms and E. Zardini (Eds.), The Sorites Paradox (pp. 263-286). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Recanati, F. (2018). Force et contenu. In Ambroise B. (Eds.), De l'action du discours : le concept de speech act au prisme de ses histoires. (pp. 193-211). London: ISTE

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Recanati, F. (2017). About the lekton. Response to Max Kölbel. In I. Depraetere et R. Salkie (Eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line (pp. 215-224). Berlin: Springer

Recanati, F. (2017). Cognitive Dynamics: A New Look at an Old Problem. In M. de Ponte et K. Korta (Eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Pelletier, J. (2018). L’attrait esthétique de la fiction : un point de vue de philosophie cognitive. In C. Bouriau et G. Schuppert (Eds.), Perspectives philosophiques sur les fictions (pp. 131-153). Paris: Kimé

Pelletier, J. (2018). Being Quasi-Moved: a View from the Lab. In F. Cova & S. Rehault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 168-193). New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019

Pelletier, J. (2019). Inflection and Representation . In Pelletier, J & Voltolini, A. (Eds.), The Pleasure of Pictures:Pictorial Experience And Aesthetic Appreciation, Routledge Studies In Contemporary Philosophy (pp. 145-61). New York: Routledge Studies In Contemporary Philosophy

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press