ENS - Ecole Normale Supérieure
Back to top

Publications

Monograph  

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Monograph  

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Monograph  

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Book chapter  

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Book chapter  

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Book chapter  

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Monograph  

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Other  
Other  

Origgi, G. (2018). https://www.openaire.eu.

Other  

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Book chapter  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Book chapter  

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Book chapter  

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Monograph  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Other  

Lussange, J., Belianin, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Gutkin, B. (2017). A bright future for financial agent-based models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.08222

Book chapter  

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Monograph  

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Book chapter  

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

Book chapter  

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared AgencySpringer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Book chapter  

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature