Grèzes, J. & Dezecache, G. (2014). Bases cérébrales et cognitives de la communication émotionnelle. In M. Botbol (Eds.), L'empathie au carrefour des sciences et de la cliniqueJohn Libbey Eurotext
Grèzes, J., Valabrègue, R., Gholipour, B. & Chevallier, C. (2014). A direct amygdala-motor pathway for emotional displays to influence action: A diffusion tensor imaging study. Human brain mapping, 35(12), 5974-83. doi:10.1002/hbm.22598
International Journal article
Grèzes, J., Wicker, B., Berthoz, S. & De Gelder, B. (2009). A failure to grasp the affective meaning of actions in autism spectrum disorder subjects. Neuropsychologia, 47(8-9). doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.02.021
International Journal article
de Vignemont, F. (2021). A Minimal Sense of Here-ness. The Journal of Philosophy, 118(4), 169-187. doi:10.5840/jphil2021118413
de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press
El Zein, M., Wyart, V. & Grèzes, J. (2015). Anxiety dissociates the adaptive functions of sensory and motor response enhancements to social threats. eLife, 4. doi:10.7554/eLife.10274
International Journal article
Claidière, N., Trouche, E. & Mercier, H. (2017). Argumentation and the diffusion of counter-intuitive beliefs. Journal of experimental psychology. General, 146(7), 1052-1066. doi:10.1037/xge0000323
Book chapter
Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press
de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Awareness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, .
Book chapter
de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4
Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano on Judgment. (pp. 103–109).
Book chapter
Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena. (pp. 97–102).
Book chapter
Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan