Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.

Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Egré, P. (2018). Qu'est-ce que le vague? Vrin - Chemins Philosophiques

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob