ENS, Pavillon Jardin's meeting room, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris
Abstract : Psychological moments refer to purported subjective, unified temporal units in perception, cognition, and action. These are typically classified into three types, varying in duration and complexity. In recent years, efforts have been made to connect these notions of psychological moments with theories of time consciousness, which aim to explain the fundamental temporal structure of consciousness. If successful, this would provide empirical support for time consciousness theories, which have thus far been supported primarily through philosophical and phenomenological considerations. This presentation examines these proposals, exploring three levels of psychological moments in relation to cinematic, extensionalist, and retentionalist models of time consciousness. It is argued that psychological moments do not correspond with the phenomena that time consciousness theories aim to explain. As a result, the proposed connection between psychological moments and time consciousness theories is unfounded, and the empirical findings related to psychological moments do not substantiate these theories.