Séminaire
Doc'In Nicod

Is state consciousness first ? Creature and State Consciousness in light of the for-me-ness of experience

Intervenant(s)
Alberto Barbieri (IUSS, Pavia, Italy)
Informations pratiques
28 juin 2018
14h-16h
Lieu

Salle de Réunion Pavillon Jardin, 24 rue Lhomond, 75005 Paris

IJN

Abstract

An important distinction in philosophy of mind is the one between creature and state consciousness. These two ‘consciousness properties’ are supposed to identify two distinct explananda. They are, however, undoubtedly interconnected, and any theory of consciousness must state which of these properties is its primary explanandum. The vast majority of philosophers of mind, indeed, claims that creature consciousness depends, or is derivative, on state consciousness. I call this view the Priority of State Consciousness thesis (PSC).

The aim of this talk is to put pressure on the truth of PSC. I use the discussions about the for-me-ness (or subjective character) of experience to argue against this thesis. More precisely, I argue that those philosophers who advocate for the existence of for-me-ness cannot endorse PSC.

I begin by clarifying the way I am going to use the distinction at issue, and by offering an overview of the position which considers for-me-ness as the proper explanandum of theories of consciousness, namely Subjectivism. Then I show that the best candidate to combine Subjectivism with PSC is the view called “state self-awareness view.” Such a view claims that for-me-ness is constituted by an awareness those mental states have of themselves. For reason of time and for his explicit endorsement of PSC, I focus mainly on the variant provided by Kriegel, that is self-representationalism. Finally, I argue that this view is untenable for phenomenological reasons, and that one should reject PSC to preserve Subjectivism.