Shared grief

Shared grief is sometimes offered by philosophers as a paradigm for shared emotion. More specifically, an example (from Max Scheler) of parents grieving together over their dead child has inspired metaphysically demanding accounts on which shared emotion is understood as the sharing, amongst two or more subjects, of a token emotional episode. In this paper I argue that even if such accounts can be made to work for other emotions, they are not a good fit for grief. In responding to some ways in which Scheler’s example is misleading, I offer a metaphysically undemanding account of shared grief that better respects both the nature of grief and the on-the-ground realities of grief in groups. On this account, just as individual grief is a heterogeneous process of recognising and accommodating significant loss, so too is shared grief. My focus here is on shared grief, which might occur in relatively small groups such as couples or families. However, I end by suggesting that the account I offer of shared grief brings into view the possibility of accounting for some instances of more large-scale collective grief, as well as, potentially, other shared and collective emotional processes.

2022-2023 Nicod Philosophy Colloquium. 

Slots for external participants are limited. If you’d like to attend a session, please send an email about one week before that session to Denis Buehler.