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Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).
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Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).
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Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).
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Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.
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Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
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Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).
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Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2017). How regret moves individual and collective choices towards rationality. Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making: Rational …
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect. In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (Eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social SignificanceRowman & Littlefield
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press
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Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury
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Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge