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Publications

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2017). Metaethical Relativism. (pp. 119–134).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2001). For Whom is the Problem of the Essential Indexical a Problem? . (pp. 304-315).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2017). Aesthetic Adjectives. In Louise McNally, in Young, James (Eds.), The Semantics of Aesthetic Judgment (pp. 17-37).Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Evaluative Predicates and Evaluative Uses of Ordinary Predicates. In Bekki, D. et al. (Eds.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2015 Workshops, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series (pp. 128-140).Springer-Verlag

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2011). Context, Meaning and Logical Truth. In Gupta, A. and van Benthem, J. (Eds.), Logic and Philosophy Today (Vol. 30, pp. 11-24). London: College Publications, Studies in Logic Series

Ouvrage édité  

Stojanovic, I. (2008). I investigate the relationship among the notions of meaning, content, and what is said. It is widely held that indexicals – words like 'this', 'I', or 'today' – contribute their reference, and nothing but their reference, to the semantic content, and ther. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). Feeling the world as being here. In F. de Vignemont, A. Serino, H.Y. Wong, A. Farnè (Eds.), The world at our fingertips: A multidisciplinary investigation of peripersonal space, Oxford : Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Lussange, J., Belianin, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Gutkin, B. (2020). Learning and Cognition in Financial Markets: A Paradigm Shift for Agent-Based Models. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Vol. 1252, pp. 241-255). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-55190-2_19

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009