Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2005). A Different Story about Indexicals. , Amsterdam: ILLC Research Reports

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Bouvier, A. (2009). Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science : Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies. , 143–61

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Emotional Disagreement. The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values. Dialogue, 51(1), 99-117

Stojanovic, I. (2013). Context and the Attitudes.

Dezecache, G. (2013). La communication émotionnelle ou le jeu des affordances sociales. Santé Mentale, 177, 26-31

Terrone, E. (2017). La La La ricerca della felicità – Matrimonio, rimatrimonio e non-matrimonio nella commedia romantica. Segnocinema, 205, 16-18

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Origgi, G. (2018). https://www.openaire.eu.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Stojanovic, I. (2008). I investigate the relationship among the notions of meaning, content, and what is said. It is widely held that indexicals – words like 'this', 'I', or 'today' – contribute their reference, and nothing but their reference, to the semantic content, and ther. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller

Origgi, G. (2019). Passions Sociales. Paris: PUF

Recanati, F. (2020). Langage, discours, pensée. Collège de France

de Vignemont, F. (2023). Désenchanter le corps.

de Vignemont, F. (2023). Affective bodily awareness.

Bouvier, A. (1995). Les Paralogismes d'Un Point de Vue Sociologique. Hermes, 16 , 45

Bouvier, A. (1998). Histoire des Idées, Sociologie des Croyances Et Processus Argumentatifs Scepticisme Et Modernité D’Après Richard H. Popkin. Revue de Synthèse, 119(2-3), 307–322

Proust, J. (1999). Indexes for Action. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1999 (3), 321–345

Proust, J. (1999). Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals. Erkenntnis, 51(1 ), 545–562

Proust, J. (2000). Les Conditions de la Connaissance de Soi. Philosophiques, 27(1), 161–186

Boudon, R., Bouvier, A., Demeulenaere, P., Dupuy, J., Engel, P. & Gnassounou, B. (2000). Interventions. Cités, 1, 157–170

Proust, J. (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese, 129(1), 105–128

Proust, J. (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Philosophical Psychology , 15(4), 543–550

Bouvier, A. (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1 ), 51–70

Bouvier, A. (2002). Dans quelle mesure la théorie sociale de James Coleman est-elle trop parcimonieuse?

Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of Oneself as the Same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4 ), 495–509

Bouvier, A. (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34(3), 382–407. doi:10.1177/0048393103260772

Bouvier, A. (2004). Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Société Libre? Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Citoyenneté Libératrice? Ce Qui Reste de l'Horizon Marxiste - En Quoi Et Pourquoi le Marxisme N'est Plus Une Croyance Orientant l'Action Collective. Actualité de la Politique Délibérative, de l'Économie Nor. Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 102(2), 311–332