Publications

Bouvier, A. (2002). An Epistemological Plea for Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice Theory in Cognitive Rhetoric. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1 ), 51–70

Bouvier, A. (2002). Dans quelle mesure la théorie sociale de James Coleman est-elle trop parcimonieuse?

Proust, J. (2002). A Critical Review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Philosophical Psychology , 15(4), 543–550

Proust, J. (2001). A Plea for Mental Acts. Synthese, 129(1), 105–128

Boudon, R., Bouvier, A., Demeulenaere, P., Dupuy, J., Engel, P. & Gnassounou, B. (2000). Interventions. Cités, 1, 157–170

Proust, J. (2000). Les Conditions de la Connaissance de Soi. Philosophiques, 27(1), 161–186

Proust, J. (1999). Indexes for Action. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1999 (3), 321–345

Proust, J. (1999). Mind, Space and Objectivity in Non-Human Animals. Erkenntnis, 51(1 ), 545–562

Bouvier, A. (1998). Histoire des Idées, Sociologie des Croyances Et Processus Argumentatifs Scepticisme Et Modernité D’Après Richard H. Popkin. Revue de Synthèse, 119(2-3), 307–322

Bouvier, A. (1995). Les Paralogismes d'Un Point de Vue Sociologique. Hermes, 16 , 45

Proust, J. (2021). Le naturalisme philosophique et les sciences. Raison présente, 219, 53-63. doi:10.3917/rpre.219.0053

Origgi, G. (2021). Ground Zero. The Triangle of Humiliation. In Yale Political Theory Seminar, Yale, United States.

Chiril, P. , Moriceau, V. , Benamara, F. , Origgi, G., Coulomb-Gully, M. & Mari, A. (2020). He said “who’s gonna take care of your children when you are at ACL?”: Reported Sexist Acts are Not Sexist. In 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 2020, France, 4055-4066. doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.373

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part II) In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Hannover.

Feest, U. , Bouvier, A., Henderson, D. , Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Risjord, M. , Roth, P., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2019). Special Issue (Part I) , Vol. 49: In Joint Session of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS) and the Roundtable on Philosophy of the Social Sciences , Hannover.

Chiril, P. , Moriceau, V. , Benamara, F. , Mari, A., Origgi, G. & Coulomb-Gully, M. (2020). An Annotated Corpus for Sexism Detection in French Tweets. In LREC 2020, Marseille, EuropeanLanguageResourcesAssociation (ELRA), 1397–1403.

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Origgi, G. (2019). Passions Sociales. Paris: PUF

Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.

Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge