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Publications

Ouvrage édité  

de Vignemont, F. (2023). Désenchanter le corps.

Ouvrage édité  

de Vignemont, F. (2023). Affective bodily awareness.

Ouvrage édité  

Recanati, F. (2020). Langage, discours, pensée. Collège de France

Ouvrage édité  

Stojanovic, I. (2008). I investigate the relationship among the notions of meaning, content, and what is said. It is widely held that indexicals – words like 'this', 'I', or 'today' – contribute their reference, and nothing but their reference, to the semantic content, and ther. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Soria Ruiz, A., Maldonado, M. & Stojanovic, I. (2022). Good and Ought in Argumentation: COVID-19 as a Case Study. In Oswald, S., Lewiński, M., Greco, S., Villata, S. (Eds.), The Pandemic of Argumentation - Argumentation Library (pp. 43-64).Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_3

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). Feeling the world as being here. In F. de Vignemont, A. Serino, H.Y. Wong, A. Farnè (Eds.), The world at our fingertips: A multidisciplinary investigation of peripersonal space, Oxford : Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Kaiser, A. & Stojanovi, I. (2021). Exploring Valence in Judgments of Taste. In Wyatt, Jeremy, Zakkou, Julia & Zeman, Dan (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste (pp. 231-259).Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2021). Fictional reference as simulation. In Emar Maier, Andreas Stokke (Eds.), The language of fiction (pp. 17-36).Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0002

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2021). Mental Files. The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 535-547). doi:10.1017/9781108698283.030

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2021). Entertaining as Simulation. In Gabriele M. Mras, Michael Schmitz (Eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition (pp. 266). New York: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2021). Derogatory Terms in Free Indirect Discourse. In Maier, Emar & Stokke, Andreas (Eds.), The Language of Fiction (pp. 349-378).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press