Falck, A., Strickland, B. & Jacob, P. (2022). Social Cognition and Moral Evaluation in Early Human Childhood. In O. Houdé & G. Borst (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 269-298). doi:10.1017/9781108399838.016
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Maldonado, M. & Stojanovic, I. (2022). Good and Ought in Argumentation: COVID-19 as a Case Study. In Oswald, S., Lewiński, M., Greco, S., Villata, S. (Eds.), The Pandemic of Argumentation - Argumentation Library (pp. 43-64).Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_3
de Vignemont, F. (2021). Feeling the world as being here. In F. de Vignemont, A. Serino, H.Y. Wong, A. Farnè (Eds.), The world at our fingertips: A multidisciplinary investigation of peripersonal space, Oxford : Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kaiser, A. & Stojanovi, I. (2021). Exploring Valence in Judgments of Taste. In Wyatt, Jeremy, Zakkou, Julia & Zeman, Dan (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste (pp. 231-259).Routledge
Recanati, F. (2021). Fictional reference as simulation. In Emar Maier, Andreas Stokke (Eds.), The language of fiction (pp. 17-36).Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0002
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2021). Mental Files. The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 535-547). doi:10.1017/9781108698283.030
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2021). Entertaining as Simulation. In Gabriele M. Mras, Michael Schmitz (Eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition (pp. 266). New York: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2021). Derogatory Terms in Free Indirect Discourse. In Maier, Emar & Stokke, Andreas (Eds.), The Language of Fiction (pp. 349-378).Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307
Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2020). Bounded reason in a social world. In Ricardo Viale (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury
de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge