Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).
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Graupner, M. & Gutkin, B. (2012). Dynamical Approaches to understanding cholinergic control of nicotine action pathways in the dopaminergic reward circuits. Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction (Springer ed.).Ahmed and Gutkin (eds.)
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Caze, R., Humphries, M. & Gutkin, B. (2013). Dendrites enhance both single neuron and network computation. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer
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Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer
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Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer
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Kuznetsov, A. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Dopaminergic cell Models. The Encyclopedia of Computational Neuroscience (pp. 2958-2965).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).
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Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2017). How regret moves individual and collective choices towards rationality. Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making: Rational …
de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press
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de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge
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de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press
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de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury
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Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005