Publications

Stojanovic, I. (2001). For Whom is the Problem of the Essential Indexical a Problem? . (pp. 304-315).

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Mamassian, P., Landy, M., Maloney, L., Rao, R., Olshausen, B. & Lewicki, M. (2002). Bayesian modelling of visual perception. In R. Rao, B. Olshausen & M. Lewicki (Eds.), Probabilistic Models of the Brain: Perception and Neural Function (pp. 13-36). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Stojanovic, I. (2005). A Different Story about Indexicals. , Amsterdam: ILLC Research Reports

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Stojanovic, I. (2011). Context, Meaning and Logical Truth. In Gupta, A. and van Benthem, J. (Eds.), Logic and Philosophy Today (Vol. 30, pp. 11-24). London: College Publications, Studies in Logic Series

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).

Stojanovic, I. (2012). Emotional Disagreement. The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values. Dialogue, 51(1), 99-117

Stojanovic, I. (2013). Context and the Attitudes.

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP

Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008

Stojanovic, I. (2016). Evaluative Predicates and Evaluative Uses of Ordinary Predicates. In Bekki, D. et al. (Eds.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2015 Workshops, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series (pp. 128-140).Springer-Verlag

Lussange, J., Belianin, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Gutkin, B. (2017). A bright future for financial agent-based models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.08222