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Koralus, P. & Mascarenhas, S. (2018). Illusory Inferences in a question-based theory of reasoning. In Turner, Ken and Horn, Laurence (Eds.), Pragmatics, Truth, and Underspecification: Towards an Atlas of Meaning (pp. 300–322). Leiden: Brill
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Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press
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Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Introduction. In Uriak Kriegel (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (pp. 1-11). London and New York: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (Eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical PhilosophyPalgrave-Macmillan
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect. In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (Eds.), Emotional Experience: Ethical and Social SignificanceRowman & Littlefield
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Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2017). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun. (pp. 7–46).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Philosophical Program. (pp. 21–32 ).
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano on Judgment. (pp. 103–109).
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Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena. (pp. 97–102).
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Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.
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Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).
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Pacherie, E. (2004). Looking for the Agent in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 2, 54–55.
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Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).
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Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.
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Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
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Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).
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Schlenker, P. (2011). Indexicality and de Se Reports. In von Heusinger, Maienborn and Portner (Eds.), Semantics (Vol. 2, pp. 1561-1604).