Publications

Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2004). Looking for the Agent in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 2, 54–55.

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University

Nicolas, D. (2014). Review of Oliver, Alex and Smiley, Timothy (2013) Plural Logic. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Nicolas, D. (2011). Review of Pelletier, Jeff (ed.) (2010) Kinds, Things, and Stuff. Language, 87, 3, 650-652. doi:10.1353/lan.2011.0051

Nicolas, D. (2006). Massif / comptable. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Compositionalité: questions philosophiques. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Ambiguïté. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique