Publications

de Vignemont, F. (2006). When do we empathize. In Chris Frith (Eds.), Empathy and fairness (pp. 181-196). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Casati, R. & Tonello, F. (2018). Voto elettronico e partecipazione democratica. Web e società democratica (pp. 3-15). Turin: Accademia University Press

Chevallier, C. (2021). Vivre dans un environnement risqué : quels impacts pour la psychologie ? In Claudia Senik (Eds.), Sociétés en danger (Odile Jacob ed., pp. 197 à 208). Paris: La Découverte. doi:10.3917/dec.senik.2021.01.0197

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Jacob, P. & de Vignemont, F. (2017). Vicarious experiences: perception, mirroring or imagination? In Julian Kiverstein (Eds.), Routledge handbook of the social mind (pp. 498-514).

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D. & Van Rooij, R. (2015). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. Unifying the philosophy of truth (pp. 409–430).

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Ruys, E. & Spector, B. (2017). Unexpected Wide-Scope Phenomena. In Everaert, Martin and Henk C. Van Riemsdijk (Eds.), The Companion to SyntaxWiley. doi:10.1002/9781118358733.wbsyncom089

Ramus, F. & Szenkovits, G. (2011). Understanding the nature of the phonological deficit. (pp. 153-169). doi:10.4324/9780203838006

de Vignemont, F. & Mercier, H. (2016). Under influence: is altercentric bias compatible with Simulation theory? In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Alvin Goldman and his CriticsBlackwell

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Nicolas, D. (2005). Types of degrees and types of event structures. Event arguments: foundations and applications (pp. 277-300).

Casati, R. (2017). Two, then Four Modes of functioning of the mind: towards an unification of “dual” theories of reasoning and theories of cognitive artifacts. In J. M. Zacks, H. A. Taylor (Eds.), Representations in Mind and World. Essays inspired by Barbara Tversky (pp. 7-23). New York: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2017). Trust and Reputation. In J. Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Trust. London and New York: Routledge

Schlenker, P. (2007). Transparency: An Incremental Theory of Presupposition Projection. In U. Sauerland and P. Stateva (Eds.), Presuppositions and Implicatures in Compositional Semantics (pp. 214-242).

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

de Vignemont, F. & Massin, O. (2015). Touch. In M. Matthen (Eds.), Oxford University Press

Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).

Chevallier, C. (2019). Theory of mind and autism: Revisiting Baron-Cohen et al.’s Sally-Anne study. In A. Slater and P. Quinn (Eds.), Developmental Psychology: Revisiting the Classic Studies 2nd edition (pp. 148-163).Sage

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).