Publications

Bernal Velasquez, R., Jacob, P., Kistler, M., Papineau, D. & Dokic, J. (2013). Précis of "E-Physicalism-a Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" Ideas Y Valores, 62(152 ), 268–297

Bonnay, D. (2017). Es is für jeden einzelnen nicht rational, wählen zu gehen. Die Zeit

Cozic, M. (2017). On the Explanatory Relevance of Neuroeconomics. In Lunchtime Talk, Center for Philosophy of Science, Université de Pittsburgh.

Cozic, M. (2017). Le rôle de la psychologie dans la théorie néo-classique du consommateur. In Campanolo, Gilles et Gharbi, Jean-Sébastien (Eds.), Philosophie économique, un état des lieux (Vol. 11, pp. 385-488).Editions Matériologiques

Egré, P. & Cozic, M. (2011). If-Clauses and Probability Operators. Topoi, 30 (1), 17–29

Gayon, J. (2017). La philosophie des sciences et l'histoire des sciences peuvent-elles être intégrées ? .

Gayon, J. (2017). Are population genetics models reversible ? In Second Franco-Mexican advanced seminar in History and Philosophy of Science, UNAM, México.

Gayon, J. (2017). Qu’est-ce qu’un scientifique ? De la splendeur du vrai au métier . In Marc Silberstein (Eds.), Qu’est-ce que la science… pour vous ? (pp. 107-112). Paris: Éditions matériologiques

Gayon, J. (2017). Histoire et philosophie de la biologie. Entretien réalisé par Anna Maria Dielli .

Kistler, M. (2017). Colours and Looks as Powers and Manifestations . In Jonathan Jacobs (Eds.), Causal Powers Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kistler, M. (2017). Highe-Level, Downward and Specific Causation. In Michele Paolini Paoletti et Francesco Orilia (Eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Pespectives on Downward Causation (pp. 54-75). New York and Abingdon: Routledge

Kostic, D. (2017). Structure of topological explanation : a heuristic for characterizing scientific understanding in mathematical and non-causal explanations. In Workshop “Unifying the debates : mathematical and non-causal explanations”, IHPST Paris.

Loison, L., Gayon, J. & Burian M. , R. (2017). The Contribution – and Collapse – of Lamarckian Heredity in Pastorian Microbiology : 1. Lysogeny, 1900-1960 . Journal of the History of Biology, 50(1), 5-52

Moltmann, F. & Textor, M. (2017). Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional. New York: Oxford University Press

Moltmann, F. (2017). Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (Eds.), Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays (pp. 34–59 ). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Moltmann, F. (2017). Partial Content and Expressions of Part and Whole. Discussion of Stephen Yablo: Aboutness. Philosophical Studies, 174 (3), 797–808

Moltmann, F. (2017). On the Ontology of 'Cases' In N. Flaux, P. Haas, K. Paykin, V. Mostrov & F. Tayalati (Eds.), De la passion du sens en linguistique: hommages à Danièle Van de Velde (Les Presses Universitaires de Valenciennes ed.).

Moltmann, F. (2017). Number Words as Number Names. Linguistics and Philosophy , 40(4), 331–345

Moltmann, F. & Textor, M. (2017). Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. In F. Moltmann, M. Textor (Eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives (pp. 254-290). New York: Oxford University Press

Moltmann, F. (2017). A Plural Reference Interpretation of Three-Dimensional Syntactic Trees . In C. van Urk, H. Kotek, C. Halpert (Eds.), A Pesky Set. Papers for David Pesetsky. MIT Working Papers in Linguistics (MITWPL) Mass.: MIT Cambridge

Moltmann, F. (2017). Natural Language Ontology . Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics, New York: Oxford UPOxford UP

Moltmann, F. (2017). Attitude Reports, Cognitive Products, and Attitudinal Objects: A Response to G. Felappi On ProductBased Accounts of Attitudes. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 6(1), 3–12

Vorms, M. (2017). On Reasonable Doubt. In HPS departmental seminar, Cambridge, Royame-Uni.

Zarebski, D. (2017). On the Realism of Human and Machine Representational Constraints : A Functionalist Account on Cognitive Ontologies . In G. Dodig-Crnkovic R. Giovagnoli (Eds.), Representation and Reality : Humans, Animals and Machine (pp. 347-363).Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_18