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Publications

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2006). When do we empathize. In Chris Frith (Eds.), Empathy and fairness (pp. 181-196). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Casati, R. & Tonello, F. (2018). Voto elettronico e partecipazione democratica. Web e società democratica (pp. 3-15). Turin: Accademia University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Jacob, P. & de Vignemont, F. (2017). Vicarious experiences: perception, mirroring or imagination? In Julian Kiverstein (Eds.), Routledge handbook of the social mind (pp. 498-514).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D. & Van Rooij, R. (2015). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. Unifying the philosophy of truth (pp. 409–430).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Ruys, E. & Spector, B. (2017). Unexpected Wide-Scope Phenomena. In Everaert, Martin and Henk C. Van Riemsdijk (Eds.), The Companion to SyntaxWiley. doi:10.1002/9781118358733.wbsyncom089

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. & Mercier, H. (2016). Under influence: is altercentric bias compatible with Simulation theory? In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), Alvin Goldman and his CriticsBlackwell

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Nicolas, D. (2005). Types of degrees and types of event structures. Event arguments: foundations and applications (pp. 277-300).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Casati, R. (2017). Two, then Four Modes of functioning of the mind: towards an unification of “dual” theories of reasoning and theories of cognitive artifacts. In J. M. Zacks, H. A. Taylor (Eds.), Representations in Mind and World. Essays inspired by Barbara Tversky (pp. 7-23). New York: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2017). Trust and Reputation. In J. Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Trust. London and New York: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Schlenker, P. (2007). Transparency: An Incremental Theory of Presupposition Projection. In U. Sauerland and P. Stateva (Eds.), Presuppositions and Implicatures in Compositional Semantics (pp. 214-242).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. & Massin, O. (2015). Touch. In M. Matthen (Eds.), Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Ripley, D., Verheyen, S. & Egré, P. (2019). The Sorites Paradox in Psychology. In S. Oms and E. Zardini (Eds.), The Sorites Paradox (pp. 263-286). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. & Massin, O. (2009). The sense of touch. In Timothy Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilken (Eds.), Oxford companion to consciousnessOxford University Press.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Schlenker, P. (2016). The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface. In Aloni, Maria and Dekker, Paul (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics (pp. 664-727). doi:10.1017/CBO9781139236157.023

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press