Publications

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Chevallier, C. (2021). Vivre dans un environnement risqué : quels impacts pour la psychologie ? In Claudia Senik (Eds.), Sociétés en danger (Odile Jacob ed., pp. 197 à 208). Paris: La Découverte. doi:10.3917/dec.senik.2021.01.0197

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).

Chevallier, C. (2019). Theory of mind and autism: Revisiting Baron-Cohen et al.’s Sally-Anne study. In A. Slater and P. Quinn (Eds.), Developmental Psychology: Revisiting the Classic Studies 2nd edition (pp. 148-163).Sage

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.