Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press
Autres
Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Falck, A., Strickland, B. & Jacob, P. (2022). Social Cognition and Moral Evaluation in Early Human Childhood. In O. Houdé & G. Borst (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 269-298). doi:10.1017/9781108399838.016
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005
Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.
Dezecache, G. (2013). La communication émotionnelle ou le jeu des affordances sociales. Santé Mentale, 177, 26-31
Autres
Bouvier, A. (2009). Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science : Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies. , 143–61
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature
Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2017). How regret moves individual and collective choices towards rationality. Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making: Rational …