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Publications

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Ouvrage  

Kriegel, U. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Ouvrage  

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Ouvrage  

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Autres  

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Ouvrage  

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Autres  
Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).