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Publications

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Ouvrage  

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Ouvrage  

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Autres  

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Ouvrage  

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Castro, V. (2022). Robots and Resentment: Commitments, recognition and social motivation in HRI. Emotional Machines. Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine InteractionSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Autres  
Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).