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Publications

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared AgencySpringer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Ouvrage  

Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2020). The Mind under the Axioms. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/C2017-0-02647-2

Ouvrage  

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Autres  

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Ouvrage  

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Autres  
Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Ouvrage  

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Autres  

Dezecache, G. (2013). La communication émotionnelle ou le jeu des affordances sociales. Santé Mentale, 177, 26-31

Autres  

Bouvier, A. (2009). Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science : Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies. , 143–61

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Chapitre d'ouvrage  

Bouvier, A. (2011). Individualism, Collective Agency and The “Micro–Macro Relation”. In Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (pp. 199).Sage Publications