Publications

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Stojanovic, I. (2021). Derogatory Terms in Free Indirect Discourse. In Maier, Emar & Stokke, Andreas (Eds.), The Language of Fiction (pp. 349-378).Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership. In Uriah Kriegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.4

de Vignemont, F. (2020). Un homme augmenté mais à quel prix ? In Bénédicte Boyer-Bévière, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (Eds.), L’humain en transformation. Entre transhumanisme et humanité (pp. 23-30). doi:10.4000/cdst.2307

Massin, O. & de Vignemont, F. (2020). Unless I Put My Hand into His Side, I Will Not Believe: The Epistemic Privilege of touch. In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Eds.), The Epistemology of non-Visual Perception (pp. 165).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Alsmith, A. & Longo, M. (2019). Using VR technologies to investigate the flexibility of human self-conception. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (Eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 153-174). London: Bloomsbury

de Vignemont, F. (2019). Against phenomenal parsimony: a plea for bodily feelings. In Goldman, Alvin McLaughlin, McLaughlin (Eds.), Metaphysics and cognitive science Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2019). The phenomenology of bodily ownership. In Guillot, Marie Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Eds.), The sense of mineness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

de Vignemont, F. & Sackur, J. (2018). La conscience. In Collins, Thérèse, Tallon-Baudry, Catherine, Andler, Daniel (Eds.), La cognitionGallimard

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Schéma corporel et image corporelle. In De Boeck/Solal (Eds.), Manuel de psychomotricité

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press

de Vignemont, F. (2018). The first-person in pain. In Bain, D., Brady, M., Corns, J. (Eds.), Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and DevianceRoutledge

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009

Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de Ch. Plantin, 2016, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. Une introduction aux études d’argumentation. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 1-5). Lyon: ENS Editions

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de F.H. Van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E.C.W.Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J.H.M. Wagemans (eds), 2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 7-11). Dordrecht: Springer Verlag

Recanati, F. (2017). About the lekton. Response to Max Kölbel. In I. Depraetere et R. Salkie (Eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line (pp. 215-224). Berlin: Springer

Recanati, F. (2017). Cognitive Dynamics: A New Look at an Old Problem. In M. de Ponte et K. Korta (Eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language Oxford: Oxford University Press