Publications

Ting, C. , Palminteri, S., Engelmann, J. & Lebreton, M. (2019). Decreased confidence in loss-avoidance contexts is a primary meta-cognitive bias of human reinforcement learning. bioRxiv. doi:10.1101/593368

Rooy, M., Koukouli, F., Maskos, U. & Gutkin, B. (2018). Nicotinic modulation of hierarchal inhibitory control over prefrontal cortex resting state dynamics: modeling of genetic modification and schizophreniarelated pathology. bioRxiv, 301051. doi:10.1101/301051

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2015). Trade-off between dendritic democracy and independence in neurons with intrinsic subthreshold membrane potential oscillatio. In Remme et al (eds) (Eds.), Dendritic ComputationSpringer

Remme, M., Lengyel, M. & Gutkin, B. (2014). Phase Response Methods in Dendritic Dynamics. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .

Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).

Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).

Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).

Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).

Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.

Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).

Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.

Origgi, G. (2018). https://www.openaire.eu.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapport éthique du projet Openair.

Origgi, G. (2018). Rapports du working group ALLEA Trust, Truth and Expertise.

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Novikov, N. & Gutkin, B. (2018). Role of NMDA conductance in average firing rate shifts caused by external periodic forcing. arXiv , 1812.03609

Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005