Publications

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press

Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42

de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001

de Vignemont, F. (2020). What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(1), 117-137. doi:10.1017/apa.2019.34

Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag

Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28

Cepollaro, B., Domaneschi, F. & Stojanovic, I. (2020). When is it ok to call someone a jerk? An experimental investigation of expressives. Synthese, . doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02633-z

Stojanovic, I. (2009). When Truth Gives Out, by Mark Richard . Disputatio, 27, 150-158

Proust, J. (2006). Why Evolution has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind . Biological Theory, 1(4), 349-351

Branch-Smith, T. , Origgi, G. & Morisseau, T. (2022). Why Trust Raoult? How Social Indicators Inform the Reputations of Experts. Social Epistemology, 36(3), 299-316 . doi:10.1080/02691728.2022.2042421

Proust, J. (2008). XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 108(1pt3), 241–268

Kim, S., Paulus, M., Sodian, B. & Proust, J. (2016). Young Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Ignorance in Informing Others. PloS one, 11(3), e0152595. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595