Publications

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2021). L'Énigme de la raison.

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kriegel, U. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Gutkin, B. & Ahmed, S. (2012). Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Falck, A., Strickland, B. & Jacob, P. (2022). Social Cognition and Moral Evaluation in Early Human Childhood. In O. Houdé & G. Borst (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 269-298). doi:10.1017/9781108399838.016

Chevallier, C. (2021). Vivre dans un environnement risqué : quels impacts pour la psychologie ? In Claudia Senik (Eds.), Sociétés en danger (Odile Jacob ed., pp. 197 à 208). Paris: La Découverte. doi:10.3917/dec.senik.2021.01.0197

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2020). Bounded reason in a social world. In Ricardo Viale (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality

Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. & Strickland, B. (2020). The mental files theory of singular thought: A psychological perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone and N. Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental FilesOxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Chevallier, C. (2019). Theory of mind and autism: Revisiting Baron-Cohen et al.’s Sally-Anne study. In A. Slater and P. Quinn (Eds.), Developmental Psychology: Revisiting the Classic Studies 2nd edition (pp. 148-163).Sage

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury

Arcangeli, M. & Dokic, J. (2018). Affective Memory: A Little Help From Our Imagination. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, (pp. 139–157).Routledge,

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press

Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.