Publications

Proust, J. (2021). Le naturalisme philosophique et les sciences. Raison présente, 219, 53-63. doi:10.3917/rpre.219.0053

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Egré, P. (2018). Qu'est-ce que le vague? Vrin - Chemins Philosophiques

Origgi, G. (2018). Reputation. What it is and Why it matters. Princeton University Press

Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (2018). Metacognitive Diversity - An Interdisciplinary approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Proust, J. (2017). Non-human Metacognition.

Terrone, E. & Ferraris , M. (2017). Filosofia teoretica. Bologna,: Il Mulino

Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Gutkin, B. & Ahmed, S. (2012). Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction.

Recanati, F., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva, N. (2010). Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity.

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Soria Ruiz, A., Maldonado, M. & Stojanovic, I. (2022). Good and Ought in Argumentation: COVID-19 as a Case Study. In Oswald, S., Lewiński, M., Greco, S., Villata, S. (Eds.), The Pandemic of Argumentation - Argumentation Library (pp. 43-64).Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_3

Berthommier, F. & Lorenzi, C. (2021). Implications of Physiological Mechanisms of Amplitude Modulation Processing for Modeling Complex Sounds Analysis and Separation. (pp. 12). doi:10.1201/9781003064183

Kaiser, A. & Stojanovi, I. (2021). Exploring Valence in Judgments of Taste. In Wyatt, Jeremy, Zakkou, Julia & Zeman, Dan (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste (pp. 231-259).Routledge

Pressnitzer, D., Agus, T., Kang, H. , Graves, J. & Andrillon, T. (2021). Apprentissage de motifs sonores. In S. Samson, B. Tillmann, C. Jourdan, V. Brun (Eds.), Audition et Cognition Montpellier: Sauramps Medical

Recanati, F. (2021). Fictional reference as simulation. In Emar Maier, Andreas Stokke (Eds.), The language of fiction (pp. 17-36).Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0002

Recanati, F. (2021). Mental Files. The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 535-547). doi:10.1017/9781108698283.030

Recanati, F. (2021). Entertaining as Simulation. In Gabriele M. Mras, Michael Schmitz (Eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition (pp. 266). New York: Routledge

Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press

Stojanovic, I. (2021). Derogatory Terms in Free Indirect Discourse. In Maier, Emar & Stokke, Andreas (Eds.), The Language of Fiction (pp. 349-378).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5

Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob

Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008

Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge

Shamma, S. (2020). Temporal Coherence Principle in Scene Analysis. The Senses: A Comprehensive Reference (Second Edition) (Vol. 2, pp. 777-790).Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.24252-1

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge