Publications

Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008

Arcangeli, M. & Dokic, J. (2018). Affective Memory: A Little Help From Our Imagination. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, (pp. 139–157).Routledge,

Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University

Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge

Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge

Lussange, J., Belianin, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Gutkin, B. (2021). Learning and Cognition in Financial Markets: A Paradigm Shift for Agent-Based Models. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Vol. 1252, pp. 241-255). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-55190-2_19