Publications

Proust, J. (2021). Penser vite ou penser bien ? Odile Jacob

Asic, T. & Corblin, F. (2014). Telic definties and their prepositions. French and Serbian. In Aguilar-Guevara, Ana, Bert Le Bruyn and Joost Zwarts (Eds.), Weak Referentiality (pp. 183-212).Benjamins

Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.

Bouvier, A. (2011). Individualism, Collective Agency and The “Micro–Macro Relation”. In Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (pp. 199).Sage Publications

Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.

Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de Ch. Plantin, 2016, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation. Une introduction aux études d’argumentation. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 1-5). Lyon: ENS Editions

Bouvier, A. (2017). Analyse critique de F.H. Van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E.C.W.Krabbe, A.F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J.H.M. Wagemans (eds), 2014, Handbook of Argumentation Theory. L’Année sociologique (Vol. 67, pp. 7-11). Dordrecht: Springer Verlag

De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.

Giannakidou, A. & Mari, A. (2017). La dimension épistémique du futur : le rôle des adverbes. In Baranzini and de Saussures (Eds.), Le Futur dans les langues RomanesPeter Lang Ag

Graupner, M. & Gutkin, B. (2012). Dynamical Approaches to understanding cholinergic control of nicotine action pathways in the dopaminergic reward circuits. Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction (Springer ed.).Ahmed and Gutkin (eds.)

Gutkin, B. & Ahmed, S. (2012). Computational Neuroscience of Drug Addiction.

Gutkin, B. (2015). Theta-neurons. In Springer Verlag (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Comptutational Neuroscience (pp. 1034-1042).

Gutkin, B. & Stiefel, K. (2014). Cholinergic Neuromodulation of Phase Response Curves. In Schultheiss et al (eds) (Eds.), Phase Response Cruves in NeuroscienceSpringer

Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Mari, A. (2018). The French Future : evidentiality and information increase. Evidence for Evidentiality (pp. 199-226). Dordrecht: Benjamins

Nicolas, D. (2018). The logic of mass expressions. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University

Nicolas, D. (2014). Review of Oliver, Alex and Smiley, Timothy (2013) Plural Logic. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Nicolas, D. (2011). Review of Pelletier, Jeff (ed.) (2010) Kinds, Things, and Stuff. Language, 87, 3, 650-652. doi:10.1353/lan.2011.0051

Nicolas, D. (2006). Massif / comptable. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Compositionalité: questions philosophiques. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2006). Ambiguïté. Sémanticlopédie: dictionnaire de sémantique

Nicolas, D. (2005). Types of degrees and types of event structures. Event arguments: foundations and applications (pp. 277-300).

Nicolas, D. (2002). La distinction entre noms massifs et noms comptables. Leuven: Editions Peeters

Nicolas, D. (2002). La catégorisation des noms communs : massifs et comptables. Catégorisation et Langage (pp. 29-51).

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation: What it is and why it Matters. Princeton University Press

Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press

Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge