Stojanovic, I. (2001). For Whom is the Problem of the Essential Indexical a Problem? . (pp. 304-315).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2002). Intention .
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving Intentions. (pp. 401-414).
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2005). A Different Story about Indexicals. , Amsterdam: ILLC Research Reports
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2006). On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference . (pp. 259-280).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
De Brabanter, P., Nicolas, D., Stojanovic, I. & Villanueva Fernandez, N. (2007). Les usages déférentiels. In Bouvier, Alban and Conein, Bernard (Eds.), L'épistémologie sociale. Une théorie sociale de la connaissance (pp. 139-162).Editions de l'EHESS
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive? (pp. 153-175).
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2008). Perception, Emotions and Delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion . (pp. 07-126).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).
Autres
Bouvier, A. (2009). Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science : Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies. , 143–61
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2010). Self-Agency.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28
Stojanovic, I. (2011). Context, Meaning and Logical Truth. In Gupta, A. and van Benthem, J. (Eds.), Logic and Philosophy Today (Vol. 30, pp. 11-24). London: College Publications, Studies in Logic Series
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). Action. (pp. 92–111 ).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2012). Emotional Disagreement. The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values. Dialogue, 51(1), 99-117
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2013). Context and the Attitudes.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2014). Prepragmatics: Widening the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary . In Burgess, Alexis and Brett Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning (pp. 311–326). Oxford: OUP
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2016). Evaluative Predicates and Evaluative Uses of Ordinary Predicates. In Bekki, D. et al. (Eds.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2015 Workshops, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series (pp. 128-140).Springer-Verlag