Bouvier, A. (2018). Selected Papers from the 6th ENPOSS Meeting, Cracow, 20-22 September, 2017.
Direction de numéro de revue
Ylikoski, P., Bouvier, A., Kaldis , B., Montuschi , E., Zahle , J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2017). Selected Papers from the 5th ENPOSS Meeting, Helsinki, 24-26 August, 2016. Special issue of Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Maldonado, M. & Stojanovic, I. (2022). Good and Ought in Argumentation: COVID-19 as a Case Study. In Oswald, S., Lewiński, M., Greco, S., Villata, S. (Eds.), The Pandemic of Argumentation - Argumentation Library (pp. 43-64).Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-91017-4_3
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kaiser, A. & Stojanovi, I. (2021). Exploring Valence in Judgments of Taste. In Wyatt, Jeremy, Zakkou, Julia & Zeman, Dan (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste (pp. 231-259).Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2021). Fictional reference as simulation. In Emar Maier, Andreas Stokke (Eds.), The language of fiction (pp. 17-36).Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0002
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2021). Mental Files. The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press ed., pp. 535-547). doi:10.1017/9781108698283.030
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2021). Entertaining as Simulation. In Gabriele M. Mras, Michael Schmitz (Eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition (pp. 266). New York: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2021). Derogatory Terms in Free Indirect Discourse. In Maier, Emar & Stokke, Andreas (Eds.), The Language of Fiction (pp. 349-378).Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Multiple Grounding. In Springer (Eds.), Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series (Vol. 142). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_5
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Penser avec le langage. Langue et Science, Langage et Pensée (pp. 147-164).Collège de France/Éditions Odile Jacob
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Coreference De Jure. In Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (Eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746881.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury
Bouvier, A. (2018). Intentional, unintentional and sub-intentional aspects of social mechanisms and rationality. The example of commitments in political life. In Gérald Bronner, Francesco Di Iorio (Eds.), The Mystery of Rationality: Mind, Beliefs and the Social Sciences (pp. 17-35). Cham (CH): Springer Nature
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kim, S., Shahaeian, A. & Proust, J. (2018). Developmental diversity in mindreading and metacognition. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M (Eds.), Metacognitive Diversity (pp. 97-133).OUP
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2018). Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). New York: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value .
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Proust, J. (2018). Consensus as an epistemic norm for group acceptance. In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (Eds.), Extended Epistemology Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Proust, J. (2018). Metacognition. In T. Crane (Eds.), Rootledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2018). Contextualism and Singular Reference. In J. Collins et T. Dobler (Eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception (pp. 181-196). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0009
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2018). From Meaning to Content. In D. Ball et B. Rabern (Eds.), The Science of Meaning : Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 113-137). Oxford : Oxford University Press