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Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Varieties of bodily feelings. In Kriegel, Uriah (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Jacob, P. & de Vignemont, F. (2017). Vicarious experiences: perception, mirroring or imagination? In Julian Kiverstein (Eds.), Routledge handbook of the social mind (pp. 498-514).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Casati, R. & Tonello, F. (2018). Voto elettronico e partecipazione democratica. Web e società democratica (pp. 3-15). Turin: Accademia University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Was Descartes right after all? An affective background for bodily awareness. . In Tsakiris, Manos de Preester, Helena (Eds.), The Interoceptive Basis of the Mind: from homeostasis to awareness Oxford: Oxford University Press
Autres
Branchini, C., Cardinaletti, A., Cecchetto, C., Donati, C. & Geraci, C. (2015). WH-duplication in Italian Sign Language (LIS) , 39–70John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi:10.1075/bct.71.03bra
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2021). What is the body schema? In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka, and Shaun Gallagher (Eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851721.003.0001
Article dans une revue nationale
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Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Chapitre d'ouvrage
de Vignemont, F. (2006). When do we empathize. In Chris Frith (Eds.), Empathy and fairness (pp. 181-196). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28
