Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic & Pascal Engel, J. (2018). Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances. A Dual View. In F. Dorsch & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Phenomenal Presence (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0008
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. (2018). The Uncanny and Other Negative Existential Feelings. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions (pp. 6-76).Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315537467
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press
Ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Dokic, J. (2018). The Role of Noetic Feelings in Sensory Substitution. In F. Macpherson (Eds.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Proceedings of the British Academy Oxford University Press
Ouvrage
Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Kriegel, U. (2019). The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling. In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (Eds.), he Philosophy of Perception and Observation Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter
Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Arcangeli, M., Sperduti, C. & Dokic, J. (2018). The beautiful, the sublime and the self. In F. Cova et S. Réhault (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics (pp. 175-196).Bloomsbury
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008
Autres
Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).
Ouvrage
Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005