Stojanovic, I. (2010). When Is Action Intentional? A Problem for Ginet's Acausal Account of Intentional Action. Vox Philosophiae, 18-28
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2003). What to Say on What Is Said. In Blackburn et al. (Eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2680. (pp. 300-313). Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Autres
Stojanovic, I. (2007). What Is Said as Lexical Meaning. Cadernos de Filosofia, 21, 7-42
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. & Haggard, P. (2010). What Are Intentions? . (pp. 70–84).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2019). Trust and Reputation as Filtering Mechanisms of Knowledge. In P. Graham (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology London: Routledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Origgi, G. (2020). Trust and Reputation. In Judith Simon (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and PhilosophyRoutledge
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions . (pp. 145-167).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Butterfill , S. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Towards a blueprint for a social animal. In Fiebich, Anika (Eds.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (pp. 111-125).Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2009). The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. (pp. 69–82).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Soria Ruiz, A., Stojanovic, I. & Cepollaro, B. (2021). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Value Judgments. In Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Philosophy of Language (pp. 434-449).Cambridge University Press
Ouvrage
Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency . (pp. 343-389).
Beran, M., Brandl, J., Perner, J. & Proust, J. (2012). The Foundations of Metacognition.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2014). Talking about the Future: Settled Truth and Assertion. In De Brabanter, Ph., Kissine, M. and Sharifzadeh, S. (Eds.), Future Times, Future Tenses (pp. 26-43).Oxford: OUP
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2016). Speaking About Oneself. (pp. 200–219 ). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0008
Autres
Origgi, G. (2018). South, Status and Knowledge: Epistemic Dominance and Forms of Epistemic Injustice.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2012). Situation Semantics. (pp. 67-86).
Ouvrage
Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Predelli, S. & Stojanovic, I. (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. (pp. 63–90).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Mylopoulos, M. & Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In A. Mele (Eds.), Surrounding Self-Control (pp. 81-100). Oxford : Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005
Origgi, G. (2019). Reputation in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology. In F. Giardini, R. Wittek (Eds.), he Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation (pp. 69-81).Oxford University Press
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Pacherie, E. (2002). Reply to John Campbell on Joint attention and simulation.
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Stojanovic, I. (2010). Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account. (pp. 139-160).
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Recanati, F. (2020). Reference and Singular Thought. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference (pp. 399-408).Routledge